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Abstract	
This	 study	 uses	 the	 VAR-BEKK	 methodology	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 equity	 returns	 and	 currency	
exposure	for	a	sample	of	U.S.,	U.K.	and	Japanese	banks	and	insurance	firms	during	2003-2011.		The	findings	indicate	
that	 banks’	 equity	 returns	 are	 negatively	 related	 to	 changes	 in	 foreign	 currency	 value	 during	 the	 recent	 financial	
crisis	 (2008-2011).	 	 That	 is,	 the	U.S.	 (Japanese)	banking	 sector	 returns	are	negatively	 correlated	 to	 changes	 in	 the	
Japanese	 Yen	 (U.S.	 dollar).	 	 Equity	 returns	 of	 U.S./U.K.	 insurers	 are	 negatively	 linked	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 value	 of	
Japanese	Yen,	and	this	relationship	 is	accentuated	during	the	crisis.	 	Home	currency	exposure	 is	not	significant	 for	
any	 insurer.	 	When	size	 is	 taken	 into	account,	only	small	U.S.	banks	are	exposed	to	home	currency	changes,	while	
only	large	Japanese	banks	are	exposed	to	foreign	currency	changes.		Overall,	the	negative	relationship	between	the	
foreign	 currency	 value	 and	 bank/insurance	 equity	 returns	 supports	 the	 “flight	 to	 quality”	 hypothesis	 from	 the	
U.S./U.K.	to	Japan.	
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1. Introduction	
Prior	to	the	collapse	of	the	Bretton	Woods	system	in	1971,	foreign	currency	fluctuations	along	with	their	impact	on	
equity	markets	received	little	attention.		In	the	post-Bretton	Woods	era,	currencies	began	to	float	freely	against	each	
other	driven	by	demand	and	supply	in	global	markets.		Since	then,	the	impact	of	currency	fluctuations	has	received	
greater	attention	(Shapiro,	1975;	Flood	and	Lessard,	1986;	He	and	Ng,	1998).		More	recently,	Bredin	and	Hyde	(2011)	
investigate	the	sources	of	 foreign	exchange	exposure	of	 industry	 level	portfolios	 in	 the	G7	and	conclude	that	such	
exposure	increases	with	the	level	of	trade	openness	and	competiveness.		The	currency	effect	on	financial	institutions’	
performance	has	been	examined	by	scholars	focusing	on	U.S.	banking	(Grammatikos	et	al.,	1986;	Choi	et	al.,	1992;	
Wetmore	 and	 Brick,	 1994,	 1998),	 	 Japanese	 banking	 (Chamberlain	 et	 al.,	 1997)	 as	well	 as	 the	 insurance	 industry	
(Mange	2000;	Elyasiani	et	al.,	2007).	Typically	the	extant	literature	focuses	on	large	institutions,	given	that	these	are	
more	 likely	 to	be	 international	 in	 focus	and	 therefore	potentially	more	exposed	 to	 currency	 risks.	 	 Yet,	 such	 firms	
may	also	engage	in	greater	currency	hedging	activities	given	their	access	to	exchange	and	over-the-counter	currency	
derivatives	–	so	this	could	mitigate	such	risks.								
The	 contribution	 of	 the	 current	 study	 is	 threefold.	 	 First,	 we	 examine	 the	 currency	 sensitivity	 of	 financial	
institutions	 across	major	 geographical	 regions	 (UK,	 Japan	 and	U.S.)	 and	 types	 of	 institutions	 (banks	 and	 insurers).	
Doukas	 et	 al.	 (1999)	 and	 Grant	 and	 Marshall	 (1997)	 among	 others,	 have	 focused	 on	 either	 different	 types	 of	
institutions	within	a	country	or	the	same	type	of	institutions	across	countries,	although	(to	our	knowledge)	no	study	
to	date	does	both1.	 	Second,	we	use	an	alternative	estimation	framework,	namely	the	VAR-BEKK	model,	aiming	to	
capture	the	time-varying	conditional	variance-covariance	among	asset	returns,	while	increasing	estimation	efficiency	
(simultaneous	 estimation	 of	 return	 and	 variance-covariance).	 	 Finally,	 unlike	 previous	 studies	 focusing	 on	 home	
currency	 fluctuations,	 this	 paper	 looks	 at	 both	 home	 and	 foreign	 currency	 sensitivity	 of	 bank/insurance	 equity	
portfolio	 returns.	 	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 latter,	 we	 test	 for	 both	 home	 and	 foreign	 currency	 effects
2
.	 	 Changes	 in	
currency	 values	 across	 markets	 mirror	 investors’	 preferences	 towards	 different	 currencies.	 Financial	 assets	 are	
usually	traded	in	home	currency	terms	and	thus	the	need	to	obtain	that	currency	is	apparent
3
.		In	addition,	according	
to	the	“flight	 to	quality”
	
hypothesis	 (Lang	and	Nakamura,	1995;	Eichengreen	et	al.,	2001;	Vayanos,	2004)	 investors	
are	likely	to	reallocate	their	investments	from	risky	to	safer	ones
4
.		Therefore,	changes	in	currency	values	can	mirror	
investors’	preference	across	countries.		However,	investor’s	preferences	represented	by	home	currency	effects	may	
be	difficult	to	detect.		Chow	et	al.	(1997a)	argue	that	due	to	effective	hedging	activity,	the	impact	of	home	currency	
																																								 																				
1
	See	Doukas	et	al	(1999)	and	Grant	and	Marshall	(1997)	using	Japanese	and	U.K.	institutions;	Chamberlain	et	al.	(1997)	for	banking	firms	in	the	U.S.	and	Japan;	
Martin	(2000)	for	major	banks	in	Japan,	Switzerland,	the	U.S.	and	the	U.K.;	and	Elyasiani	and	Mansur	(2003)	using	banks	from	Japan,	Germany	and	the	U.S.	
2
	Home	(foreign)	currency	effect	 is	defined	as	 the	relationship	between	the	equity	 returns	of	a	 financial	 institution	and	 its	home	(the	 foreign)	currency	value	
fluctuations	measured	as	the	return	of	a	trade	weighted	currency	price	index.		The	latter	is	a	basket	of	currencies	from	21	industrial	countries	constructed	by	the	
BoE.	
3
	This	is	based	on	the	“asset	approach”	hypothesis	first	introduced	by	Branson	(1983)	and	Frankel	(1983).		Empirically,	the	studies	by	Kanas	(2000)	and	Froot	and	
Ramadorai	(2005)	support	this	argument.		Froot	and	Ramadorai	(2005)	refer	to	the	relationship	between	supply/demand	of	a	currency	and	the	currency	value	as	
the	“flow-centric”	view.		The	“flow”	refers	to	the	order	flow	for	a	currency	from	major	currency	traders.		The	empirical	evidence	show	the	order	flow	information	
is	significantly	related	to	currency	value.					
4
	Oetzel	et	al.	(2001)	show	that	the	stability	of	a	country’s	currency	value	is	related	to	the	country’s	economic	risk	level,	which	is	represented	by	four	different	
measures	in	their	study:	Institutional	Investor	Index,	country	risk	rating	from	Euromoney,	data	from	International	Country	Risk	Guide	(ICRG),	and	risk	level	from	
Political	Risk	Services	(PRS).		Naes	et	al.	(2011)	test	and	support	the	flight	to	quality	hypothesis	across	countries.		
3	
	
variations	on	firm’s	equity	value	is	weak	or	even	undetectable,	especially	in	the	short-run.		Reichert	and	Shyu	(2003)	
also	argue	 that	 the	currency	swaps	generally	 reduce	 the	currency	 risk	 for	 the	U.S.,	European	and	 Japanese	banks.		
Thus,	a	model	using	only	home	currency	fluctuations	may	fail	to	detect	the	existence	of	the	“flight	to	quality”	effect.	
A	multivariate	 VAR-BEKK	model	 comprising	 a	 VAR	 system	 of	 conditional	mean	 equations	 for	 sector	 portfolio	
returns	 and	 a	 conditional	 variance-covariance	 estimation	 framework	 with	 a	 BEKK	 parameterization	 is	 employed.			
The	 sample	 period	 is	 2003-11	 (1
st
	 quarter)	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 U.S.,	 U.K.	 and	 Japanese	 banking	 and	 insurance	
industries.	 	Equally	weighted	portfolios	are	constructed	for	the	banking	and	 insurance	firms.	The	conditional	mean	
equation	of	portfolio	returns	 is	specified	as	a	 function	of	market,	 interest	rate,	home	and	foreign	currency-related	
risk	factors.		The	latter	includes	both	the	changes	and	variability	of	currency	values.		A	structural	break	is	introduced	
into	the	VAR-BEKK	model	in	order	to	investigate	the	effects	of	the	recent	financial	crisis	on	the	relationship	between	
fluctuating	currency	values	and	the	returns	of	banks	and	insurance	firms.	
The	empirical	analysis	suggests	that	the	impact	of	foreign	currency	on	banking	portfolios	has	changed	after	the	
recent	financial	turmoil.	 	Changes	 in	the	value	of	the	U.S.	Dollar	(Japanese	Yen)	have	a	negative	 influence	on	large	
Japanese	(U.S.)	bank	returns	providing	support	for	the	“flight	to	quality”	hypothesis.		Equity	returns	for	U.K.	and	U.S.	
insurance	firms	are	negatively	related	to	changes	 in	the	 Japanese	Yen.	 	This	relationship	 is	accentuated	during	the	
recent	financial	crisis.		The	returns	of	the	insurance	portfolios	are	unaffected	by	home	currency	exposure,	but	foreign	
currency	exposure	has	a	significant	impact	on	U.K.	and	U.S.	insurers.	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follow.		Section	2	provides	a	summary	of	the	literature	investigating	
the	relationship	between	currency	exposure	and	the	returns	of	 financial	 institutions.	 	Section	3	describes	 the	data	
and	estimation	 framework	used	 to	 test	our	 research	hypotheses.	 	 	 Section	4	presents	 the	 results	of	 the	empirical	
analysis	and	Section	5	concludes	the	paper.	
	
2. Literature	Review	
This	 section	presents	 a	 summary	of	 recent	 studies	 into	 the	 relationship	between	currency	 fluctuations	and	equity	
values
5
.	 	 The	 literature	 is	 categorized	 according	 to	 whether	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 currency	 exposure	 of	 financial	
institutions,	firm	size	effects	or	alternative	modeling	approaches.	
	
2.1.	Currency	Exposure	of	Financial	Institutions	
One	 of	 the	 early	 studies	 by	 Grammatikos	 et	 al.	 (1986)	 shows	 that	 foreign	 currency	 denominated	 gaps	 on	 banks’	
balance	 sheet	 are	 responsible	 for	 their	 FOREX	 exposure	 during	 1976-81.	 	 Banks	 are	 highly	 exposed	 to	 individual	
foreign	currencies	but	not	at	an	aggregate	level.		They	argue	that	the	low	aggregate	currency	exposure	of	U.S.	banks	
is	due	to	diversification	effects	given	the	low/negative	correlations	among	foreign	currencies
6
.	
																																								 																				
5
	To	keep	the	task	manageable,	this	section	presents	a	brief	overview	of	some	of	the	empirical	findings	with	no	intention	to	lessen	the	importance	of	any	studies	
excluded.		A	detailed	survey	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	study.	
6
	The	study	investigates	the	U.S.	banks’	exposure	to	five	different	foreign	currencies	(Canadian	dollar,	German	mark,	French	franc,	GBP	and	JPY).		The	currency	
exposure	is	measured	as	the	relationship	between	bank’s	wealth	and	changes	in	the	net	position	for	each	of	the	five	foreign	currencies.		Individual	(aggregate)	
4	
	
Most	of	the	subsequent	literature	tends	to	focus	on	the	currency	exposure	of	large	banks
7
.		Wetmore	and	Brick	
(1994,	1998)	investigate	the	currency	exposures	of	the	79	largest	U.S.	banks	during	1986-95.		Both	studies	conclude	
that	the	main	source	of	currency	exposure	results	from	un-hedged	foreign	loan	activities.		Chamberlain	et	al.	(1997)	
support	this	argument	when	evaluating	the	currency	exposure	of	the	largest	U.S.	(30)	and	Japanese	(89)	banks	during	
1986-93.	 Their	 findings	 indicate	 that	 currency	exposure	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	 the	 volume	of	hedging	 activity,	 as	
measured	 by	 the	 nominal	 value	 of	 off-balance	 sheet	 items	 (interest	 rate	 and	 foreign	 exchange	 derivates).	 	 This	
argument	 is	 dismissed,	 however,	 by	 Choi	 and	 Elyasiani	 (1997)	 who	 provide	 empirical	 evidence	 based	 on	 the	 59	
largest	U.S.	banks	over	1975-92.	They	show	that	hedging	activity	(gauged	by	the	level	of	off-balance	sheet	activity)	
could	 increase	 systemic	 risk	 –	 especially	 when	 hedging	 is	 via	 currency	 derivatives.	 	Martin	 (2000)	 	 examines	 the	
currency	exposure	of	 the	world’s	30	 largest	banks	 from	1994	 to	1996.	 	He	 finds	 that	over	40%	of	 the	banks	were	
significantly	 exposed	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 value	of	 their	 home	 currency.	 	 The	 currency	 exposure	of	 the	U.S.	 banking	
sector,	however,	was	found	to	be	insignificant	during	the	sample	period	suggesting	that	U.S.	banks	were	more	risk	
averse	or	their	hedging	was	more	effective.	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 attention	 paid	 to	 banks,	 few	 studies	 have	 examined	 the	 currency	 exposure	 of	 insurance	
companies.	 	Mange	 (2000)	was	 the	 first	 to	demonstrate,	 theoretically,	 how	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 value	of	 the	home	
currency	 influences	the	equity	value	of	 insurance	firms.	 	He	shows	that	both	 life	and	non-life	 insurance	companies	
may	be	exposed	to	currency	risk	through	issuing	insurance	products	in	foreign	markets.		This	is	true	when	they	are	
issuing	long-term	products.		Elyasiani	et	al.	(2007)	provide	the	first	empirical	study	into	the	currency	exposure	of	U.S.	
insurance	firms	using	data	spanning	1991	to	2001.		They	find	a	significant	and	positive	relationship	between	changes	
in	the	trade	weighted	USD	price	index	and	the	returns	of	U.S.	insurers.			
	
2.2.	Firm	Size	and	Currency	Exposure	
Given	 that	 large	 companies	are	more	 likely	 to	engage	 in	global	 activity,	 then	 that	makes	 them	prone	 to	a	greater	
currency	risk	exposure	(Jorion,	1990).		Greater	currency	exposure	for	large	firms,	however,	may	be	mitigated	if	there	
are	significant	economies	of	scale	in	currency	hedging	activity.	 	Nance	et	al.	(1993)	argue	that	hedging	vehicles	are	
more	 likely	 to	be	deployed	by	 companies	 that	 benefit	 from	economies	of	 scale	due	 to	 the	 associated	 transaction	
costs.	 	 Based	 on	 169	 firms	 from	 Fortune	 500	 (in	 1986),	 they	 find	 that	 firms	 making	 greater	 use	 of	 hedging	
instruments	are	usually	large,	a	finding		later	confirmed	by	both	Mian	(1996)	and	Crabb	(2002).			
Size	effects	of	 financial	 institutions	have	not	been	extensively	explored	 in	 the	 literature.	 	Tai	 (2000)	evaluates	
the	potential	size	effect	among	commercial	banks	in	the	U.S.	market	during	1987-98.		His	sample	(31	banks)		reveals	
that	currency	exposure	is	only	significant	for	large	banks	–	reinforcing	Chamberlain	et	al.’s	(1997)	findings.		This	view	
is	 questioned,	 by	 Choi	 and	 Jiang	 (2009)	 who	 claim	 that	 the	 currency	 exposure	 of	 internationally	 oriented	 firms,	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 																		
currency	 exposure	 refers	 to	 the	 changes	 of	 the	USD	 against	 another	 currency	 (all	 five	 currencies).	 	 The	 largest/lowest	 correlation	 is	 between	 the	 Canadian	
dollar/GBP	and	the	German	mark	(30%	/	-29%).	
7
	Chamberlain	et	al.	 (1997)	suggest	that	research	should	focus	on	 large	banks	for	three	reasons:	1)	 large	banks	are	more	 likely	to	be	 involved	 in	 international	
activities;	2)	large	banks	are	more	likely	to	be	comparable	in	size	across	national	markets;	and	3)	large	banks	contribute	most	to	systemic	risk.	
5	
	
operating	 in	 the	 U.S.	 during	 1983-2006,	 is	 less	 than	 that	 of	 purely	 domestic-focused	 companies	 (suggesting	
multinationals	benefit	from	operational	hedging).		Using	multinational	corporations	(MNCs)	and	non-MNCs,	they	find	
that	the	non-MNCs	currency	exposure	 is	significantly	higher	than	that	of	MNCs	and	argue	that	the	 latter	are	more	
likely	to	hedge	foreign	exposures	compared	to	non-MNCs	–	a	result	consistent	with	the	findings	of	Crabb	(2002).			
	
2.3.		Modeling	Firm	Currency	Exposure	
Early	studies	use	linear	modeling	approaches	and	employ	price	levels	(rather	than	changes)	as	exogenous	risk	factors	
(Adler	and	Dumas,	1984).	 	 Linear	estimations,	however,	 can	be	biased	as	 they	do	not	 take	 the	non-stationarity	of	
exogenous	variables	 into	account.	 	As	a	 result	 some	studies	employ	 changes	 in	 values	 (Adler	et	 al.,	 1986).	 	 Jorion	
(1990)	 argues	 further	 that	 a	market	 risk	 factor	 should	 also	 be	 included	 in	 such	models.	 	 Prasad	 and	Rajan	 (1995)	
suggest	that	changes	 in	 interest	rates	should	also	be	included	given	the	evidence	of	a	strong	link	between	interest	
rate	 fluctuations	 and	 firm	 value.	 	 Staikouras	 (2003,	 2006)	 provides	 a	 survey	 on	 the	 interest	 rate	 risk	 exposure	 of	
financial	intermediaries.		Elsewhere,	others	suggest	that	firm’s	value	only	reacts	to	unexpected	changes	in	currency	
value	 (Chow	 et	 al.,	 1997a,	 1997b).	 	 Tai	 (2000)	 and	 Koutmos	 and	Martin	 (2003),	 for	 instance,	 propose	 the	 use	 of	
estimated	residuals	 from	an	autoregressive	model	 to	represent	 the	unexpected	changes	 in	 currency	value.	 	Unlike	
previous	studies,	Kolari	et	al.	(2008)	and	Choi	and	Jiang	(2009)	adopt	an	alternative	specification	by	adding	the	home	
currency	changes	to	the	Fama	and	French	(1993)	model	to	evaluate	currency	exposure.	
	
3. Data	and	Methodology		
3.1.		Data	
The	sample	period	starts	on	January	1,	2003	and	finishes	on	March	31,	2011	providing	1,924	daily	observations	after	
accounting	for	non-trading	days.		The	focus	is	on	the	U.S.,	U.K.	and	Japanese	banking/insurance	industries.		Equally	
weighted	 portfolios	 are	 constructed	 for	 the	 banking	 and	 insurance	 firms.	 	 These	 firms	 are	 later	 split	 to	 form	 size	
portfolios	 when	 enough	 companies	 are	 available	 (e.g.	 Japanese	 and	 U.S.	 banks).	 	 Given	 our	 annual	 rebalancing,	
institutions	 in	 the	 top	 quartile	 comprise	 the	 large	 firms	while	 the	 remaining	 institutions	 are	 categorized	 as	 small.		
Furthermore,	 for	each	country	 the	market	 index	and	 long-term	government	bond	yields	are	collected,	while	 trade	
weighted	currency	price	indices	for	the	Japanese	Yen	(JPY),	British	Pound	(GBP)	and	the	US	Dollar	(USD)	are	obtained	
from	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 (BoE).	 	 These	 variables	 form	 the	 set	 of	 exogenous	 risk	 factors.	 	 All	 data	 information	 is	
provided	by	Thompson	Reuters.		Table	1	provides	some	descriptive	statistics	for	our	sample.	
TABLE	1	
The	Augmented	Dickey-Fuller	Unit	Root	test	(ADF)	indicates	that	all	portfolio	returns	are	stationary	series.		In	general,	
the	mean	returns	are	negative	for	all	banking	portfolios.		Japanese	banks	have	performed	relatively	better	than	their	
U.K.	 and	U.S.	 counterparts.	 	 The	 average	 daily	 return	 of	 the	 Japanese	 banking	 sector	 is	 -0.023%	over	 the	 sample	
period,	compared	to	-0.051%	and	-0.035%	for	the	U.K.	and	U.S.	banking	sectors,	respectively.		These	results	reflect	
the	losses	generated	by	banks	during	the	crisis.		According	to	Guillén	(2009)	the	crisis	starts	at	the	beginning	of	2007	
6	
	
when	the	sub-prime	 industry	 in	 the	U.S.	market	began	 to	collapse	with	more	 than	25	sub-prime	 lenders	declaring	
bankruptcy	during	February	and	March.		The	peak	of	the	crisis	is	generally	viewed	as	the	September	15,	2008	when	
Lehman	 Brothers	 filed	 for	 bankruptcy.	 	 Therefore,	 we	 calculate	 the	 pre/post-crisis	 average	 daily	 return	 for	
bank/insurance	portfolios	based	on	two	dates:	a)	January	1,	2007	and	b)	September	15,	2008
8
.	While	insurers	were	
also	affected	by	the	credit	crisis,	the	impact	was	smaller	compared	to	that	of	banks.		From	Table	1,	one	can	see	that	
the	mean	returns	for	all	sector	portfolios	are	positive	before	January	1,	2007.		After	then	the	average	daily	returns	
are	 -0.100%/-0.097%/-0.083%	 for	 Japanese/U.K./U.S.	 banks	 and	 -0.103%/-0.032%/-0.072%	 for	 Japanese/U.K./U.S.	
insurers.		One	can	also	see	that	portfolio	returns	of	all	banks	and	insurers	became	noticeably	worse	after	the	Lehman	
Brothers	bankruptcy	on	September	15,	2008.		Of	course,	the	differential	impact	of	the	recent	financial	crisis	on	banks	
and	 insurers	 owes	 much	 to	 the	 varying	 features	 of	 these	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 to	 their	 exposure	 to	 credit	 and	
liquidity	risks
9
.			
		
3.2.		Methodology	
A	multivariate	VAR-BEKK	model	is	employed	for	the	current	study.		The	VAR-BEKK	model	has	two	components:	a)	a	
VAR	 system	 of	 conditional	 mean	 equations	 for	 sector	 portfolio	 returns,	 and	 b)	 a	 conditional	 variance-covariance	
estimation	framework	with	a	diagonal	BEKK	parameterization.	
The	conditional	mean	equation	of	portfolio	returns	is	specified	as	a	function	of	market,	interest	rate,	home	and	
foreign	 currency-related	 risk	 factors.	 	 Currency-related	 risk	 factors,	 including	 both	 the	 changes	 and	 variability	 of	
currency	values,	are	employed	to	explain	variations	in		financial	institution	portfolio	returns	(Tai,	2000;	Koutmos	and	
Martin,	2003).		The	conditional	variance-covariance	of	portfolio	returns	is	estimated	using	a	BEKK	framework.		Kroner	
and	 Ng	 (1998),	 Cappiello	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 indicate	 that	 conditional	 correlation	 among	 financial	 asset	 returns	 is	 not	
constant	over	time.		Unlike	the	constant	correlation	assumption	used	in	Elyasiani	et	al.	(2007),	there	is	no	restriction	
on	the	conditional	correlations	among	equity	returns	employed	in	our	BEKK	approach.		Therefore,	the	chosen	model	
is	more	flexible	and	provides	superior	estimation	accuracy
10
.		In	order	to	improve	estimation	efficiency,	the	model	is	
estimated	 simultaneously	 for	 both	 the	 conditional	 mean	 and	 variance-covariance	 equations.	 	 The	 estimation	
approach	is	based	on	the	Bollerslev	and	Wooldridge	(1992)	framework,	which	optimizes	the	parameter	estimation	by	
maximizing	the	sum	of	the	quasi-conditional	log-likelihood	ratios.	
Another	point	worth	noting	is	that	the	foreign	exchange	market	is	occasionally	subject	to	significant	shocks.		A	
vivid	example	is	the	2007	financial	crisis	when	currency	volatility	increased	noticeably	(Melvin	and	Taylor,	2009).		In	
order	to	investigate	the	potential	influence	of	the	crisis	on	the	relationship	between	fluctuating	currency	values	and	
																																								 																				
8
	Note	 that	 for	our	estimations	 the	September	15,	2008	 is	 employed	as	 the	 cut-off	point.	 	 The	 second	date	 (January	1,	 2007)	 is	only	used	 in	 the	descriptive	
statistics	 to	 show	 how	much	 returns	 have	 changed	 before	 and	 during	 the	 crisis.	 	 In	 that	way	we	 ascertain	 that	 the	 daily	 negative	 performance	 of	 financial	
institutions,	during	the	whole	sample	period,	is	directly	related	to	their	poor	performance	over	the	crisis	period.	
9
	For	 discussion	 on	 credit	 and	 liquidity	 risks	 for	 banks	 and	 insurers	 please	 refer	 to	 the	 report	 by	 The	Geneva	Association	 under	 the	 title	 of	 Systemic	 Risk	 in	
Insurance,	An	analysis	of	insurance	and	financial	stability,	see:	www.genevaassociation.org.		See	also	Harrington	(2009)	and	Eling	and	Schmeiser	(2010)	regarding	
the	performance	for	these	two	intermediaries.	
10
	Using	a	diagonal	BEKK	parameterization	the	number	of	estimated	coefficients	is	reduced	and	estimation	efficiency	is	enhanced	(Engle	and	Kroner,	1995).	
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the	bank/insurance	equity	returns,	a	structural	break	is	introduced	into	the	VAR-BEKK	model.		Failure	to	capture	the	
time	series	 structural	break	could	generate	biased	coefficients	 (Levi,	1994).	 	 It	 is	 known	by	now	 that	 the	currency	
exposure	of	financial	institutions	is	time-varying,	especially	when	systemically	important	events	occur.		For	instance,	
Choi	et	al.	(1992)	show	that	the	currency	exposure	of	U.S.	banks	changed	noticeably	after	the	establishment	of	the	
1979	 International	 Banking	 Act.	 	 The	 current	 study	 introduces	 slope-dummy	 variables	 into	 the	model	 to	 capture	
potential	 changes	 in	 currency	 exposure	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis
11
.	 	 According	 to	Melvin	 and	 Taylor	 (2009),	 the	
bankruptcy	announcement	made	by	Lehman	Brothers	on	September	15,	2008	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	foreign	
exchange	market	and	as	such	this	date	is	used	as	the	cut-off	point
12
.		Figures	1-2	illustrate	the	noticeable	changes,	for	
both	 the	 level	 of	 the	 three	 currency	price	 indices	 (Figure	 1)	 and	 their	 conditional	 volatilities	 (Figure	 2)	 during	 the	
entire	sample	period.	
FIGURES	1-2	
In	addition	to	the	above,	 the	effect	of	 trading	hours	under	different	 time	zones
13
	should	not	be	 ignored.	 	 It	 is	
reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 information	 generated	 from	 the	 Japanese	 and	 U.K.	 markets	 is	 likely	 to	 influence	 the	
performance	of	the	U.S.	market	on	the	same	trading	day.		For	the	U.S.	market,	however,	its	daily	price	information	
can	only	affect	the	performance	of	the	Japanese	and	U.K.	markets	on	the	following	trading	day.		Similarly,	for	the	U.K.	
it	is	assumed	that	its	daily	price	movement	can	only	affect	the	Japanese	market	on	the	following	day.		On	this	basis,	
lag	values	are	employed	to	capture	any	spillover	effects	due	to	non-synchronous	trading	among	geographic	regions.	
Given	 all	 the	 aforementioned	 information,	 the	 proposed	 VAR-BEKK	 model	 can	 be	 now	 illustrated,	 in	 matrix	
format,	as	follows.	
Conditional	mean	equation:	
�! = � ∙��!
!
+ � ∙ ��!
!
+ � ∙ ���!
!
+ Γ ∙ � ∙ ��!
!
+ Θ ∙ � ∙ ���!
!
+ �!		 	 	 (1)	
Conditional	variance-covariance	equation:	
	 �! = �!"# ∙ �!"#
!
+ �!"#�!!!�!!!
!
�!"#
!
+ �!"#�!!!�!"#
!
,                 with � ∈ 0,   																							(2)	
	 �! = �!"#$ ∙ �!"#$
!
+ �!"#$�!!!�!!!
!
�!"#$
!
+ �!"#$�!!!�!"#$
!
         with � ∈   + 1,� 	
superscript	T		is	the	transpose	operator	
τ		is	the	cut-off	date	(September	15,	2008)	capturing	the	onset	of	the	crisis	period	
																																								 																				
11
	The	dummy	variable	is	only	introduced	into	the	conditional	mean	equation	and	not	to	the	conditional	variance-covariance	equation.		The	conditional	variance-
covariance	 equation	 of	 the	 proposed	 model	 is	 based	 on	 a	 BEKK	 parameterization,	 which	 contains	 a	 component	 representing	 the	 unconditional	 variance-
covariance	matrix	of	the	financial	sector	portfolio	returns.		However,	the	unconditional	variance-covariance	matrix	may	not	change	in	a	linear	way	before	and	
after	the	structural	break.		Therefore,	the	introduction	of	a	dummy	variable	may	not	be	suitable	for	representing	a	structural	break	in	the	BEKK	model.		In	order	
to	 resolve	 the	 issue,	 the	estimation	 for	 conditional	variance-covariance	equations	 is	 separated	 into	 two	sub-periods,	namely	 the	pre-	and	post-crisis	periods.		
Interactive	(slope)	dummies	have	also	been	introduced	for	the	market	and	interest	rate	risk	factor,	but	such	specification	did	not	alter	the	results	of	the	currency	
exposure	which	is	the	main	objective	of	the	current	study.		It	is	also	worth	noting	that	by	introducing	interactive	dummies	for	the	other	risk	factors	we	increase	
the	number	of	estimated	parameters	and	reduce	the	estimation	efficiency	for	the	currency-related	risk	factors.			
12
	The	 relative	 value	 of	 both	GBP	 and	USD	 fell	markedly	 immediately	 following	 the	 collapse	 of	 Lehman	Brothers,	whereas	 the	 JPY	 appreciated	 dramatically.		
Furthermore,	the	conditional	variances	of	all	three	currency	price	indices	increased	significantly.	
13
	The	Tokyo	Stock	Exchange	opens	at	GMT	0:00	and	closes	at	GMT	6:00.		It	is	then	followed	by	the	U.K.	which	opens	at	GMT	8:00	and	closes	at	16:30.		The	New	
York	Stock	Exchange	operates	from	GMT	14:30	until	GMT	21:00.	
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Rt	=	a	[n	x	1]	matrix	representing	the	bank/insurance	portfolio	returns	(ri,t)	over	day	t,	with	i	corresponding	
to	 the	 country	where	 the	 sector	 portfolio	 belongs	 to	 and	 n	 referring	 to	 the	 number	 of	 portfolios	
employed.	
β	=	a	[n	x	3]	matrix	with	the	first	column	representing	the	constants,	while	the	second	and	third	columns	
representing	market	(βi,Market)	and	interest	rate	(βi,IR)	betas	for	the	corresponding	portfolios.	
MFt	=	a	 [n	x	3]	matrix	with	 the	 first	column	representing	 the	constants.	 	The	second	and	third	columns	
contain	the	market	(rmi,t)	and	interest	rate	(iri,	t)	risk	factors	over	day	t	for	country	i.		The	market	risk	
factor	 is	 represented	by	 the	 local	market	 index;	 the	 interest	 rate	 risk	 factor	 is	 represented	by	 the	
unexpected	changes	(estimated	residual	from	a	fitted	ARMA	model)	in	the	holding	period	return	of	a	
long-term	government	bond.	
FXt	=	a	[3	x	1]	matrix	containing	the	unexpected	changes	in	the	trade	weighted	currency	indices	(JPY,	GBP,	
USD)	 over	 day	 t.	 	 The	 unexpected	 change	 is	 the	 estimated	 residual	 from	 a	 fitted	 ARMA-GARCH	
model
14
.	
FXVt	=	a	[3	x	1]	matrix	containing	the	conditional	variances	for	the	trade	weighted	currency	indices	(JPY,	
GBP,	 USD)	 over	 day	 t.	 	 The	 conditional	 variance	 is	 generated	 from	 the	 same	 fitted	 ARMA-GARCH	
model	as	FXt.	
G	=	a	[n	x	3]	parameter	matrix	representing	the	equity	return	sensitivity	given	changes	 in	home/foreign	
currency	value	(FX)	over	the	whole	sample	period.		The	elements	of	G	are	gi,j	signifying	the	impact	of	
currency	value	changes	from	country	j	on	the	portfolio	return	of	country	i.		The	return	sensitivity	on	
home	currency	changes	are	represented	by	gi	(i=j).	
Z	=	a	 [n	x	3]	parameter	matrix	representing	the	equity	return	sensitivity	given	changes	 in	home/foreign	
currency	 variability	 (FXV)	 over	 the	 whole	 sample	 period.	 	 The	 elements	 of	 Z	 are	 zi,j	 signifying	 the	
impact	 of	 currency	 variability	 from	 country	 j	 on	 the	 portfolio	 return	 of	 country	 i.	 	 The	 return	
sensitivity	on	home	currency	variability	are	represented	by	zi	(i=j).	
Γ	 =	 a	 [n	 x	 3]	 parameter	 matrix	 representing	 the	 potential	 changes	 in	 equity	 return	 sensitivity	 given	
changes	 in	 home/foreign	 currency	 value	 (FX)	 over	 the	 crisis	 period.	 	 The	 elements	 of	 Γ	 are	 γi,j	
signifying	the	 impact	of	currency	value	changes	from	country	 j	on	the	portfolio	return	of	country	 i.		
Changes	in	return	sensitivity	on	home	currency	changes	are	represented	by	γi	(i=j).	
Θ	=	a	[n	x	3]	parameter	matrix	representing	potential	changes	in	equity	return	sensitivity	given	changes	in	
home/foreign	currency	variability	 (FXV)	over	 the	crisis	period.	 	The	elements	of	Θ	 are	θi,j	 signifying	
																																								 																				
14
	The	unexpected	changes	and	variances	of	the	currency	price	index	are	obtained	from	a	fitted	ARMA-GARCH	model	:	
CPIi,t	=	cons	+	∑
	p
i=1	αi		CPIi,t-1	+	∑
	q
i=1		βi		CPIi,t-1	+	ui,t							u~(0,ht),							hi,t	=	c	+	a	hi,t-1	+	b	u
2
i,t-1	
The	CPIi,t	is	the	trade	weighted	currency	price	index	for	currency	i	(e.g.	JPY	for	i	=	Japan)	on	day	t;	cons	is	the	constant	for	the	mean	equation,	ui,t	is	the	estimated	
residual	for	currency	i	on	day	t,	which	represents	the	CPI’s	unexpected	changes	(FXt)	on	day	t;	hi,t	is	the	CPI’s	conditional	variance	(FXVt)	on	day	t.		In	the	current	
study,	the	specification	of	the	fitted	ARMA-GARCH	model	is	ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1)	for	most	of	the	currency	price	indices.		It	is	worth	noting	that	the	correlations	
among	the	three	risk	factors	are	generally	low	(around	20%).		We	also	perform	the	variance	inflation	factor	(VIF)	test	for	the	linear	dependence	among	the	three	
risk	factors.		The	VIF	result	indicated	a	value	close	to	unity,	which	is	well	below	the	smallest	designated	threshold	(4).	
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the	 impact	 of	 currency	 variability	 from	 country	 j	 on	 the	 portfolio	 return	 of	 country	 i.	 	 Changes	 in	
return	sensitivity	on	home	currency	variability	are	represented	by	θi	(i=j).	
D	=	a	dummy	variable	representing	the	crisis	period	i.e.	D	=	0	(1)	before	(after)	September	15,	2008.	
Ht	=	a	[n	x	n]	matrix	representing	the	conditional	variance-covariance	matrix	among	the	bank/insurance	
portfolio	returns	over	day	t.	
εt	=	a	[n	x	1]	matrix	representing	the	error	term	vector	from	the	conditional	mean	equations	over	day	t.	
Cpre/post	=	 a	 [n	 x	 n]	 upper	 triangle	matrix	 representing	 the	unconditional	 part	 of	 the	 variance-covariance	
matrix	over	the	pre-/post-crisis	period.	
Apre/post	=	a	 [n	 x	n]	diagonal	parameter	matrix	 representing	 the	ARCH	effect	of	 the	conditional	variance-
covariance	matrix	over	the	pre-/post-crisis	period.	
Bpre/post	=	a	[n	x	n]	diagonal	parameter	matrix	representing	the	GARCH	effect	of	the	conditional	variance-
covariance	matrix	over	the	pre-/post-crisis	period.	
	
3.3.		Joint-Hypotheses	
Four	 hypotheses	 are	 constructed	 to	 investigate	 the	 joint-significance	 of	 parameters	 for	 risk	 factors	 representing	
home/foreign	currency	changes	(FX)	and	variability	(FXV).		In	order	to	perform	these	joint-hypotheses	tests,	a	set	of	
VAR-BEKK	 models	 are	 estimated	 with	 alternative	 conditional	 mean	 specifications	 by	 restricting	 the	 relevant		
parameters	equal	to	zero.	 	For	clearer	illustration,	the	unrestricted	conditional	mean	equation	(1)	 is	presented	in	a	
scalar	form	as	follows:			
�!,! = �! +   !,!"#$%&��!,! +  !,!"��!,! + �!,!��!,! + �!,!���!,! +  !,!, � ��!,! +  !,! � ���!,! + �!,!	 					(1a)	
with		i	and	j	∈	[Japan,	U.K.,	U.S.].	
The	 variables	 and	 parameters	 used	 in	 the	 above	 equation	 are	 the	 elements	 from	 the	 variable	 and	 parameter	
matrices	presented	in	Equation	(1).		The	four	joint-hypotheses	are	presented	below:	
H1:		 No	home	and/or	foreign	currency	variability	(FXV)	effect	
Restrictions		 	 zi,j	=	θi,j	=	0	
H2:				 No	foreign	currency	changes	(FX)	and/or	foreign	currency	variability	(FXV)	effects	
Restrictions		 	 gi,j	=	γi,j	=	zi,j	=	θi,j	=	0	(i≠j)	
H3:		 No	change	in	home	currency	(FX)	and/or	home	currency	variability	(FXV)	effect	during	the	crisis	
Unrestricted	model		 gi,j	=	γi,j	=	zi,j	=	θi,j	=	0	(i≠j)	
Restricted	model		 gi,j	=	γi,j	=	zi,j	=	θi,j	=	0	(i≠j)				plus				γi	=	θi	=	0	
H4:		 No	 change	 in	 home	 and/or	 foreign	 currency	 (FX)	 and/or	 home	 and/or	 foreign	 currency	 variability	
(FXV)	effects	during	the	crisis	
Restrictions		 	 γi,j	=	θi,j	=	0	
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4. Estimation	Results	
The	following	section	presents	the	results	from	the	VAR-BEKK	model.	First,	the	results	of	the	four	joint-hypotheses	
are	discussed.		Second,	we	examine	the	impact	of	currency	fluctuation	on	bank/insurer	portfolio	returns.		Finally,	we	
investigate	potential	size	effects	using	large	and	small	U.S./Japanese	bank	portfolios.		
	
4.1.		Joint-Hypotheses	Tests	
Table	2	summarizes	the	results	of	 the	four	 joint-hypotheses	tests.	 	As	discussed	 in	Section	3,	 the	first	 two	(H1-H2)	
investigate	the	effect	of	home	and/or	foreign	currency	fluctuations	(FX/FXV)	on	banking/insurance	portfolio	returns	
over	the	entire	sample	period.		The	remaining	hypotheses	(H3	-	H4)	examine	any	change	in	these	effects	during	the	
recent	financial	crisis.		
TABLE	2	
In	general,	the	analysis	provides	us	with	three	main	findings.	 	First,	financial	 institutions’	stock	returns	are	not	
affected	 by	 home/foreign	 currency	 variability	 (FXV).	 	 Second,	 financial	 institutions’	 stock	 returns	 are	 affected	 by	
foreign	currency	(FX)	movements.		Third,	financial	institutions’	equity	sensitivity	to	foreign	exchange	(FX)	movements	
has	changed	significantly	during	the	crisis	period.		The	first	finding	(i.e.	the	returns	of	bank/insurance	portfolios	are	
not	 sensitive	 to	 home/foreign	 currency	 variability	 -FXV-	 over	 the	 sample	 period)	 comes	 from	 testing	 the	 H1	
hypothesis,	 which	 examines	 the	 return	 sensitivity	 due	 to	 home/foreign	 currency	 variability	 (FXV)	 over	 the	whole	
sample	period.		From	Table	2,	it	is	clear	that	the	null	hypothesis	cannot	be	rejected	by	all	sector	portfolios.		This	is	in	
contrast	 to	 Koutmos	 and	Martin	 (2003)	who	 find	 evidence	 of	 a	 strong	 and	 positive	 link	 between	 home	 currency	
variability	 and	 the	 performance	 of	 U.S.	 financial	 institutions	 during	 1992-98.	 	 They	 argue	 that	 the	 positive	
relationship	 is	 because	 greater	 variation	 in	 currency	 values	 induces	 more	 hedging,	 which	 increases	 the	 profit	 of	
underwriters	(e.g.	banks)	who	issues	these	hedging	instruments	(e.g.	FOREX	derivatives).		We	argue	that	the	conflict	
in	the	results	is	mainly	due	to	the	different	sample	period	employed.		We	believe	that	during	our	sample	period	the	
main	 concern	 for	 investors	 is	 credit	 risk	 rather	 than	 currency	 exposure.	 	 This	 becomes	more	 evident	 during	 the	
recent	crisis.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 trading	volume	of	FOREX	derivatives	 should	only	 represent	a	 small	proportion	of	 the	
overall	derivatives	market	compared	to	credit-related	instruments.		Even	though	higher	variation	of	currency	values	
will	increase	the	sales	of	FOREX	derivatives,	its	apparent	impact	on	the	profitability	of	financial	institutions	appears	
to	be	limited.		Our	argument	is	supported	by	the	report	from	the	World	Federation	of	Exchanges	(WFE)
15
.		During	the	
8-year	period	from	1998	to	2006,	the	trading	volume	of	the	currency	derivatives	is	almost	unchanged.		The	trading	
volume	of	credit-related	instruments,	however,	has	increased	dramatically	during	the	same	period.		As	a	result,	the	
proportion	of	currency	derivatives	dropped	from	around	25%	of	the	total	derivatives	trading	volume	in	1998	to	8%	at	
the	end	of	2008.	
																																								 																				
15
	The	report	by	the	WFE	is	under	the	title	Derivative	Trading:	Trends	since	1998	(Davydoff	and	Naacke,	2009),	see:	www.world-exchanges.org.		
11	
	
The	second	finding	(i.e.	changes	in	foreign	currency	value	-FX-	affect	the	bank/insurance	portfolios	returns	over	
the	 sample	 period)	 is	 generated	 by	 combining	 the	 test	 results	 of	 H1	 and	 H2	 hypotheses.	 	 The	 latter	 investigates	
whether	 foreign	 currency	 changes	 (FX)	 and	 variability	 (FXV)	 can	 affect	 portfolio	 returns.	 	 Given	 that	 the	 null	
hypothesis	of	H2	is	rejected	by	all	sector	portfolios,	it	is	interesting	to	see	whether	foreign	currency	changes	(FX)	or	
variability	 (FXV)	 influence	 the	 return	 performance	 of	 bank/insurance	 portfolios.	 	We	 already	 know	 (from	H1	 test	
results)	 that	 foreign	currency	variability	 (FXV)	has	no	 influential	power	over	 the	bank/insurance	returns.	 	Thus,	we	
observe	that	bank/insurance	portfolios	are	only	sensitive	to	changes	in	foreign	currency	value	(FX).	
The	third	finding	(i.e.	the	return	sensitivity	of	these	sector	portfolios,	given	changes	in	foreign	exchange	-FX-,	has	
altered	during	the	crisis	period)	 is	derived	from	the	test	results	of	H3	and	H4	hypotheses.	 	The	former	investigates	
the	potential	 change	 in	portfolio	 returns	upon	home	currency	 fluctuations	 (FX/FXV)	during	 the	crisis	period;	while	
the	 latter	 examines	 the	 potential	 change	 in	 portfolio	 returns	 upon	 both	 home	 and	 foreign	 currency	 fluctuations	
(FX/FXV).	 	The	test	results	 indicate	that	all	bank/insurance	portfolios	reject	the	null	hypothesis	of	H4	but	not	H3
16
.		
That	means	the	return	sensitivity	due	to	foreign	currency	fluctuations	(FX/FXV)	has	changed	during	the	crisis	period.		
From	H1,	 we	 already	 know	 that	 home	 and	 foreign	 currency	 variability	 (FXV)	 do	 not	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	
bank/insurance	portfolio	 returns	during	 the	entire	 sample	period.	 	 Therefore,	 only	 the	 impact	of	 foreign	 currency	
changes	(FX)	has	intensified	during	the	crisis	period
17
.	
	
4.2.		Currency	Value	Fluctuations	and	Bank/Insurance	Portfolio	Returns	
The	 estimation	 results	 of	 the	 VAR-BEKK	 model	 for	 the	 bank/insurance	 portfolios	 across	 the	 three	 markets	 are	
presented	in	Tables	3	to	6.		Table	3	summarizes	the	estimated	parameters	for	the	banking	portfolios,	while	Table	4	
summarizes	 those	 for	 the	 insurance	 portfolios.	 	 Table	 5	 and	 6	 present	 the	 estimation	 results	 for	 large	 and	 small	
banking	portfolios	for	the	U.S.	and	Japanese	markets.			
TABLE	3	
The	 results	 show	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 changes	 in	 home	 currency	 value	 (FX)	 and	 returns	 of	 the	
Japanese	and	U.K.	banking	portfolios	are	insignificant	over	the	entire	estimation	period.		Lack	of	significance	for	the	
home	currency	exposure	could	be	due	to	hedging	practices	(Levi,	1994;	Bartov	et	al.,	1996;	Chow	et	al.,	1997a),	while	
it	is	empirically	established	that	derivatives	usage	can	be	an	effective	way	to	hedge	currency	exposure	(Cummins	et	
al.,	 1996;	 Grant	 and	 Marshall,	 1997).	 	 We	 noted	 earlier	 that	 credit	 derivatives	 have	 become	 relatively	 more	
important	(globally)	compared	to	currency	derivatives	although	the	latter	are	relatively	more	important	for	the	U.K.	
banks.		Data	from	the	BoE	suggests	that	foreign	currency	derivatives	were	popular	hedging	instruments	among	the	
																																								 																				
16
	The	only	exception	comes	from	the	large	banking	sector	portfolio,	which	we	discuss	later	in	detail	–	see	discussion	for	Tables	5	and	6.	
17
	We	also	test	two	additional	joint-hypotheses	a)	no	change	in	home	currency	(FX)	effect	and	b)	no	change	in	home	and/or	foreign	currency	(FX)	effects	during	
the	crisis	period.		Apart	from	large	banking	sector	portfolio,	the	tests	accept	(a)	and	reject	(b).		This	implies	that	only	the	foreign	currency	(FX)	effect	changed	
during	 the	 crisis	 period,	with	 one	 exception	 of	 the	 home	 currency	 (FX)	 effect	 for	 large	 banks.	 	 This	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 reported	 findings	 and	 the	 results	 are	
available	upon	request.			
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U.K.	banks	since	the	turn	of	the	millennium	and	especially	during	the	crisis
18
.		On	average,	the	outstanding	volume	of	
foreign	 currency-related	 derivatives	 accounted	 for	 approximately	 25%	 of	 the	 total	 volume	 of	 financial	 derivatives	
used	by	the	U.K.	banking	industry
19
.		We	suggest	that	the	lack	of	home	currency	exposure	for	the	U.K.	banks	is	mainly	
due	to	their	effective	hedging	activities.		Contrary	to	these	results,	the	home	currency	exposure	of	the	U.S.	banking	
portfolio	 is	 significantly	 negative	 over	 the	 whole	 sample	 period.	 	 The	 estimated	 coefficient	 for	 home	 currency	
changes	 (FX)	 is	 -4.1%	 and	 statistically	 significant.	 	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 significant	 currency	 exposure	 of	 the	 U.S.	
banking	 sector	 is	 derived	 from	activities	 of	 relatively	 small	 banks	 because	 they	have	 less	 incentive	 to	 hedge	 their	
currency	 exposures	 due	 to	 economies	 of	 scale	 required	 for	 hedging	 purposes
20
.	 	 The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 foreign	
currency	 changes	 (FX)	 is	 significant	 for	 the	 banking	 portfolios	 across	 all	 three	markets.	 	 Looking	 at	 the	 JPY	 (USD)	
effect	 on	 the	 U.S.	 (Japanese)	 banks,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 currency	 value	 is	 negatively	 correlated	with	 bank	 returns	
during	the	crisis	period.		For	the	Japanese	banks,	the	estimated	impact	of	the	USD	is	-9.7%	during	the	entire	sample	
period,	while	for	the	U.S.	banks	the	impact	of	the	JPY	reduces	by	20.0%	points	over	the	crisis	period
21
.	
According	 to	 the	 “flight	 to	 quality”	 hypothesis,	 changes	 in	 currency	 values	 can	 be	 treated	 as	 an	 alternative	
measure	of	investors’	preferences.		The	value	of	a	country’s	currency	is	related	to	the	investors’	willingness	to	hold	
financial	assets	in	this	country	(Branson,	1983;	Frankel,	1983).		As	investors	shift	their	investments	from	one	country	
to	another,	 the	value	of	 these	countries’	 currencies	 should	change	accordingly.	 	Melvin	and	Taylor	 (2009)	 support	
this	hypothesis	by	showing	that	the	value	of	the	JPY	steadily	increased	during	the	global	financial	crisis	because	Japan	
did	not	suffer	the	same	adverse	effects	as	Europe	and	the	U.S.		Interestingly,	the	value	of	the	GBP	and	the	USD	fell	
following	the	onset	of	the	crisis.		Under	the	“flight	to	quality”	hypothesis,	the	GBP	and	the	USD	depreciated	because	
the	level	of	economic	risk	in	the	U.K./U.S.	markets	increased	significantly	during	the	crisis	and	investors	shifted	their	
investments	away	from	these	two	markets	and	 into	Japan.	 	 In	such	an	environment,	 the	returns	generated	by	the	
U.K./U.S.	financial	sectors	should	have	an	inverse	relationship	with	the	value	of	JPY.		 	As	one	can	see	from	Table	3,	
the	 relationship	 between	 changes	 in	 JPY	 (USD)	 and	 returns	 on	 the	 U.S.	 (Japanese)	 banking	 portfolio	 is	 indeed	
negative	 supporting	 the	 “flight	 to	 quality”	 hypothesis.	 	 Contrary	 to	 our	 findings,	 Swanson	 (2003)	 shows	 that	
exchange	 rates	 play	 a	minor	 role	 in	 equity	markets	with	 some	of	 the	 results	 exhibiting	mixed	 patterns
22
.The	U.K.	
banking	portfolio	is	positively	related	to	changes	in	the	USD	with	a	significant	coefficient	for	the	USD	effect	(11.1%)	
																																								 																				
18
	The	 derivative	 position	 for	 the	 U.K.	 banks	 is	 collected	 from	 the	 Financial	 Derivative	 Positions	 of	 Banks	 at	 Market	 Value	 issued	 by	 the	 BoE,	 see:	
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/bankstats/current/tabf1.1.xls.		
19
	In	 the	 case	 of	 U.K.	 banks,	 the	most	 frequently	 used	 financial	 derivatives	 are	 interest	 rate-related	 derivatives,	 which	 account	 for	more	 than	 50%	 of	 total	
derivative	usage	in	terms	of	market	value.		The	commodity-	and	credit-related	derivatives	only	account	for	approximately	13%	and	7%,	respectively,	of	the	total	
derivative	volume	used	by	 the	U.K.	banking	 industry.	 	Please	note	 that	we	do	not	have	 first	hand	 information	 regarding	 the	exact	usage	of	 foreign	currency	
derivatives	or	their	effectiveness	in	terms	of	offsetting	home	and/or	foreign	currency	value	fluctuations	(banks	do	not	disclose	that).		We	argue,	however,	that	
the	large	volume	of	foreign	currency	derivatives	provides	a	possible/reasonable	explanation	for	our	empirical	findings.	
20
	For	the	home	currency	effect	on	large	and	small	U.S.	banks	see	discussion	for	Tables	5	and	6.	
21
	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	estimated	coefficients	during	the	crisis	period	only	reflect	change	in	returns’	sensitivity	to	a	particular	risk	factor.		The	coefficients	
during	the	crisis	period	are	percentage	points	rather	than	percentages.		In	order	to	obtain	the	full	magnitude	of	any	factor’s	impact	during	the	crisis	period,	one	
needs	to	sum	up	the	estimated	coefficient	over	the	entire	period	(gij/zij)	and	the	estimated	coefficient	during	the	crisis	period	(γij/θij).	 	 In	the	case	of	Japanese	
banks,	the	coefficient	for	the	USD	effect	remains	the	same	and	significant	during	the	crisis	period	since	the	change	in	the	coefficient	(0.025)	during	the	crisis	is	
insignificant.	 	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	U.S.	 banks,	 the	estimated	 coefficient	 for	 the	 JPY	effect	 is	 insignificant	over	 the	entire	 sample	period,	 but	 the	 change	 in	 the	
coefficient	(-0.200)	during	the	crisis	is	significant.	
22
	Swanson	(2003)	finds	that	changes	in	the	value	of	Deutschemark	(against	USD)	have	a	negative	relationship	with	the	German	equity	market,	while	changes	in	
the	value	of	USD	(against	JPY	or	Deutschemark)	have	a	positive	relationship	with	the	U.S.	equity	market.				
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over	the	entire	sample	period.		This	finding	further	reinforces	the	“flight	to	quality”	among	financial	institutions.		The	
U.K.	and	the	U.S.	markets	are	highly	connected	over	the	sample	period
23
	and	Chiang	and	Zheng	(2010)	show	that	the	
two	 countries	 are	 linked	 through	 herding	 behavior.	 	 Ceteris	 paribus,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 USD	 will	 decrease	 when	
investors	withdraw	from	the	U.S.,	which	in	turn	will	negatively	affect	the	U.K.	market.		Therefore,	the	USD	should	be	
positively	 correlated	 with	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 U.K.	 market,	 and	 therefore	 with	 the	 banking	 sectors	 in	 both	
countries.		Finally,	it’s	worth	noting	that	our	analysis	does	not	show	any	statistically	significant	relationship	between	
the	 Japanese	 banks	 and	 their	 home	 currency	 fluctuations	 during	 the	 crisis	 period
24
.	 	 This	 is	 interesting	 as	 the	
Japanese	banking	sector	was	heavily	exposed	to	non-performing	loans	during	2008-09	and	as	such	one	would	expect	
that	a	home	currency	appreciation	will	reduce	the	impact	of	foreign	loan	losses	in	home	currency	terms.	
Now	 our	 focus	 turns	 to	 the	 insurance	 sector.	 	 Table	 4	 contains	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 for	 the	 insurance	
portfolios.	 	 The	 results	 indicate	 that	 home	 and	 foreign	 currency	 variability	 (FXV)	 effects	 are	 insignificant	 over	 the	
sample	period.		This	could	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	insurers	are	not	highly	involved	in	currency	derivatives.			
TABLE	4	
Only	 for	 U.K.	 insurers	 the	 estimated	 coefficient	 for	 home	 currency	 (FX)	 effects	 (7.8%)	 is	 significant	 over	 the	
whole	estimation	period.	 	 It	 could	be	 that	U.K.	 insurers	 issue	 insurance	products	 in	overseas	markets	 causing	 this	
effect	(Mange,	2000).		According	to	the	information	provided	by	the	Association	of	British	Insurers	(ABI),	around	20%	
of	the	net	premium	income	of	U.K.	insurance	sector	derives	from	overseas	and	more	than	70%	of	this	is	from	sales	of	
long-term	products
25
.				
Based	 on	 the	 estimation	 results	 for	 foreign	 currency	 (FX)	 effects,	 one	 can	 see	 that	 the	 returns	 of	 the	 U.K.	
insurance	 portfolio	 are	 negatively	 linked	 to	 changes	 in	 JPY	 and,	 for	 the	 U.S.,	 during	 the	 crisis.	 	 The	 estimated	
coefficient	 of	 the	 JPY	 effect	 on	 U.K.	 insurance	 portfolio	 is	 -7.0%	 over	 the	 entire	 estimation	 period,	while	 the	 JPY	
effect	on	the	U.S.	insurance	portfolio	is	-17.7%	during	the	crisis.		For	the	Japanese	market,	changes	in	the	USD	have	a	
negative	and	significant	 impact	on	the	 insurance	portfolio	returns	-	the	estimated	coefficient	of	the	USD	effect	 is	 -
23.2%	over	the	whole	estimation	period.		Overall,	the	results	indicate	the	existence	of	competitive	effects	between	
Japan	and	the	U.K./U.S.	in	the	sense	of	attracting	investor’s	funds.		This	is	another	shred	of	evidence	supporting	the	
“flight	to	quality”	hypothesis.	
In	 addition,	 the	 GBP	 effect	 on	 U.S.	 insurers	 is	 8.1%	 over	 the	 sample	 period.	 	 However,	 this	 relationship	 has	
changed	noticeably	during	the	course	of	the	crisis.		The	estimated	coefficient	for	the	GBP	effect	has	fallen	by	12.9%	
points,	 namely	 a	 decline	 from	 8.1%	 to	 -4.8%	 (i.e.	 8.1%-12.9%).	 	 One	 possible	 explanation	 for	 this	 could	 be	 that	
investors	 no	 longer	 treat	 the	 equities	 of	 insurance	 companies	 in	 these	 two	 markets	 as	 assets	 with	 similar	
characteristics.		Therefore,	currency	changes	in	one	market	may	(in	this	case	at	least)	no	longer	serve	as	an	indicator	
																																								 																				
23
	The	 unconditional	 correlation	 between	 the	 U.K.	 and	 U.S.	 wide	market	 index	 returns	 is	 53.4%	 over	 the	 entire	 sample	 period.	 	 Information	 related	 to	 the	
unconditional	correlations	among	the	risk	factors	is	available	upon	request.	
24
	The	Z-statistic	for	the	Japanese	home	currency	fluctuations	during	the	crisis	period	(γi	Japan)	is	1.643.		See	more	discussion	in	the	next	section	when	banks	are	
separated	according	to	size	(Tables	5	and	6).			
25
	The	information	is	collected	from	several	documents	issued	by	ABI.		The	relevant	documents	include	the	U.K.	Insurance	–	Key	Facts,	the	Annual	Invested	Assets	
Overview	Statistics,	the	Long-term	Insurance	Net	Premium	Income	Statistics,	and	the	Annual	General	Insurance	Overview	Statistics,	see:	www.abi.org.uk.		
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of	 investors’	 preferences	 in	 another.	 	 By	 conducting	 additional	 tests	 for	 life	 and	 non-life	 insurance	 portfolios	
separately,	we	find	that	changes	in	GBP	affect	only	the	U.S.	non-life	insurers
26
.		We	believe	this	change	is	attributed	
to	the	different	asset	compositions	of	the	U.S.	and	U.K.	non-life	insurers.	 	Data	provided	by	Swiss	Re	indicates	that	
during	 the	 financial	 crisis	 the	 asset	 compositions	 of	 the	 U.K.	 and	 U.S.	 non-life	 insurance	 sectors	 were	 distinctly	
different
27
.	 	 The	U.K.	 non-life	 insurers	 invested	more	 than	 15%	 of	 their	 assets	 in	 real	 estate	 loans,	while	 non-life	
insurers	 in	the	U.S.	had	no	property-related	assets	 in	2008.	 	Finally,	 the	relationship	between	the	JPY	and	the	U.K.	
insurers	has	changed	significantly	during	the	crisis.	 	That	is,	the	JPY	coefficient	has	increased	by	9.9%	points	during	
the	recent	 turmoil,	pointing	 towards	a	 relatively	good	performance	of	 the	U.K.	 insurance	market	compared	to	 the	
Japanese/U.S.	insurers.	
	
4.3.		Size	Effects	and	Currency	Risks	
The	positive	relationship	between	fluctuations	in	the	currency	value	and	firm	size	may	be	due	to	incentives	to	hedge	
(Mian,	 1996)	 or	 the	 risk	 characteristics	 associated	 with	 size	 of	 an	 institution	 (He	 and	 Ng,	 1998).	 	 This	 section	
investigates	 the	 currency	 exposure	 of	 large	 and	 small	 banking	 portfolios	 in	 the	 U.S.	 and	 Japan.	 	 The	 results	 are	
presented	in	Tables	5	and	6.	
TABLES	5	-	6	
Looking	 at	 large	 and	 small	 U.S.	 banks,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 small	 banks	 are	 exposed	 to	 home	 currency	 value	
changes	 (FX)	 over	 the	 entire	 sample	 period,	while	 large	 banks	 are	 not.	 	 Economies	 of	 scale	 required	 for	 hedging	
activities	could	be	the	reason	behind	this	size	effect.		Large	companies	are	more	likely	to	engage	in	hedging	activities	
because	the	economic	incentive	for	hedging	is	greater	(Mian,	1996).		During	the	financial	crisis,	however,	both	large	
and	small	U.S.	banks	are	negatively	affected	(-27.0%	and	-19.5%,	respectively)	by	changes	in	the	JPY;	while	only	large	
U.S.	banks	are	negatively	affected	 (-17.1%)	by	changes	 in	 the	GBP.	 	Consistent	with	 the	 finding	 from	the	H1	 joint-
hypothesis	 test,	 currency	 volatility	 (FXV)	 in	 either	 home	 or	 foreign	 currency	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 risk	 factor	
throughout	the	sample	period.			
On	the	other	hand,	changes	in	the	USD	have	a	significant	negative	impact	(-15.9%)	only	on	large	Japanese	banks	
over	 the	 entire	 sample	 period,	while	 such	 sensitivity	 does	 not	 change	 during	 the	 crisis
28
.	 	 This	 differing	 response	
(large	vs	small)	cannot	be	attributed	to	asymmetry	effects	 i.e.	banks	respond	differently	 in	periods	of	depreciation	
than	in	periods	of	appreciation
29
.		Furthermore,	it	could	be	argued	that,	during	the	crisis,	Japanese	banks	benefited	
from	 the	USD	depreciation	 (given	 the	 -0.159	 coefficient),	while	 the	U.S.	 banks	 suffered	 from	 the	 JPY	appreciation	
(given	the	-0.270	coefficient).	 	 Interestingly,	when	we	look	at	the	impact	of	the	JPY	on	large/small	Japanese	banks,	
																																								 																				
26
	Test	results	are	available	upon	request.	
27
	The	information	is	collected	from	the	report	by	the	Swiss	Re	under	the	title	SIGMA	–	Insurance	Investment	in	a	Challenging	Global	Environment	(2010),	see:	
www.swissre.com.		
28
	In	the	case	of	large	Japanese	banks,	the	estimated	coefficient	for	the	USD	effect	(0.045)	is	insignificant	during	the	crisis	period.	
29
	Testing	for	asymmetry	effects	has	revealed	insignificant	values	–	results	are	available	upon	request.		Incorporating	asymmetry	effects	in	the	current	system	of	
equations	increases	dramatically	the	number	of	estimated	parameters.		In	addition,	large	and	small	banks	react	differently	to	home	and	foreign	currency	effects	
suggesting	 that	 the	 result	 cannot	 simply	be	explained	by	asymmetry	effects.	 	 Finally,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that	 asymmetric	 FX	effects	 are	 less	prominent	when	
currency	value	is	measured	by	trade	weighted	currency	indices	compared	to	bilateral	exchange	rates	(Tai,	2005	and	2008).	
15	
	
during	the	crisis	period	(coefficient	γi,Japan),	the	results	show	no	home	currency	sensitivity.		Similar	insignificant	results	
are	 reported	 in	 Table	 3	 when	 size	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 account.	 	 Chamberlain	 et	 al.	 (1997)	 shows	 that	 large	 banks	
suffered	greater	 foreign	 loan	 losses	during	crises	as	 they	were	more	 involved	 in	 international	business.	 	Thus,	one	
would	expect	that	an	increase	in	home	currency	value	will	reduce	the	impact	of	foreign	loan	losses	in	home	currency	
terms.		Data	obtained	from	the	Japanese	Bankers	Association	(JBA)	unveils	that	the	non-performing	loans	written-off	
by	Japanese	banks	increased	from	JPY452	trillion	in	2007	to	JPY1,409	trillion	in	2009
30
.		Therefore,	banks	with	large	
foreign	 losses	should	benefit	from	a	home	currency	appreciation,	which	does	not	show	up	in	our	Japanese	sample	
(coefficient	γi,Japan).	 	Our	 findings	are	 in	contrast	 to	Choi	and	 Jiang	 (2009)	who	show	that,	after	controlling	 for	size,	
MNCs	 (non-MNCs)	 face	 lesser	 (greater)	 exchange	 rate	 exposure	 –	 suggesting	 that	 multinationals	 benefit	 from	
operational	 hedging.	 	We	 show	 that	 large	 (and	 possibly	multinational)	 U.S./Japanese	 banks	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	
exposed	to	home/foreign	currency	fluctuations	than	smaller	banks.			
Finally,	no	home/foreign	currency	(FX)	effects	are	observed	for	small	Japanese	banks.		The	reason	for	this	could	
be	attributed	to	the	increased	liquidity	premiums	for	such	institutions.		Previous	empirical	studies,	investigating	the	
liquidity	 premium,	 suggest	 that	 small	 firms	 usually	 have	 lower	 market	 liquidity
31
		 compared	 to	 their	 larger	
counterparts	 (Brennan	and	Subrahmanyam,	1996;	Amihud,	2002).	 	One	could	argue	 that	market	 liquidity	 tends	 to	
decline	 during	 market	 downturns	 making	 investors	 even	 more	 concerned	 about	 assets’	 liquidity	 (Hameed	 et	 al.,	
2010).	 	 That	means	 investors	would	prefer	 to	 invest	 into	 large	 financial	 institutions,	during	 crises,	 as	 they	provide	
higher	market	 liquidity	 compared	 to	 smaller	ones.	 	 Thus,	 small	 Japanese	banks	 are	 less	 likely	 to	benefit	 from	any	
depreciation	in	the	USD	compared	to	their	larger	rivals,	especially	during	a	period	of	financial	distress.		
	
5. Concluding	Remarks	
This	paper	uses	the	VAR-BEKK	methodology	to	examine	the	relationship	between	the	returns	and	currency	exposure	
for	a	sample	of	U.S.,	U.K.	and	Japanese	bank	and	insurance	firms	between	January	2003	and	March	2011.		We	find	
little	evidence	that	the	portfolio	returns	of	banks	and	insurance	firms	are	related	to	the	conditional	variance	of	home	
or	foreign	currencies.	
Looking	at	the	banking	portfolios,	we	find	that	both	home	and	foreign	currency	changes	affect	returns	and	
the	 latter	 are	more	 pervasive.	 	We	 also	 find	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 foreign	 currency	 on	 banking	 portfolios	 generally	
change	after	the	recent	financial	crisis.		Typically,	the	home	currency	effects	on	bank	returns	are	found	to	be	more	
important	in	the	U.S.	than	in	the	U.K.	or	Japan	–	this	is	put	down	to	the	activities	of	relatively	small	banks	who	have	
less	incentive	to	hedge	or	are	otherwise	limited	in	their	currency	hedging	activities.	
																																								 																				
30
	The	 balance	 sheet	 information	 is	 collected	 from	 the	 Financial	 Statement	 of	 All	 Banks	 (FY2008	 –	 FY2011)	 provided	 by	 the	 JBA,	 see:	
http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/stats/year2_01/index.html.		In	2009,	more	than	70%	of	the	total	loan	written-offs	(i.e.	around	JPY1,002	trillion)	were	contributed	
by	large	Japanese	banks.		Besides,	during	the	4-year	period	from	2008	to	2011,	large	Japanese	banks	had	written	off	JPY2,248	trillion	worth	of	loans	compared	to	
around	JPY1,000	trillion	by	the	rest	of	the	banking	sector.	
31
	Brunnermeier	and	Pedersen	(2009)	refer	to	market	liquidity	as	the	ease	with	which	an	asset	is	traded.	
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Considering	the	results	for	insurance	firms,	we	find	that	the	portfolio	returns	of	both	U.K.	and	U.S.	insurers	
are	negatively	related	to	changes	in	the	JPY.		However,	the	impact	of	the	JPY	on	the	U.K.	insurers	has	changed	from	
negative	 to	 positive	 during	 the	 crisis	 period.	 	 For	 the	 Japanese	 insurers,	 changes	 in	 the	USD	have	 also	 a	 negative	
impact	on	 their	equity	 return	over	 the	entire	 sample	period.	 	 Furthermore,	 insurance	portfolios	are	generally	 free	
from	home	currency	exposure	-	apart	from	the	U.K.	insurers	who	have	extensive	operations	in	foreign	markets.			
Finally,	when	size	 is	 taken	 into	account,	we	 find	 that	only	 small	U.S.	banks	are	exposed	 to	home	currency	
value	fluctuation	over	the	entire	sample	period.		Changes	in	the	value	of	the	USD	(JPY)	have	a	negative	influence	on	
large	Japanese	(U.S.)	banks	providing	support	for	the	“flight	to	quality”	hypothesis.	 	That	 is,	assets	 in	the	Japanese	
market	benefit	from	USD	depreciation	while	the	U.S.	banks	suffer	from	an	appreciation	of	JPY.		The	results	indicate	
that	competitive	effects	exist	between	Japan	and	the	U.K./U.S.	 in	the	sense	of	attracting	 investor’s	funds.	 	Overall,	
these	 findings	emphasize	 the	 importance	of	 currency	markets	and	 their	 impact	on	bank/insurance	equity	 returns;	
and	gauge	the	impact	of	portfolio	size	as	well	as	the	recent	financial	turmoil.	
As	a	final	point,	the	latest	developments	in	financial	markets	(although	credit-related)	have	cast	doubt	on	the	
risk	 management	 attitude	 of	 financial	 institutions.	 	 Governments	 and	 regulators	 across	 the	 world	 are	 currently	
working	 towards	 a	 safer	 financial	 system.	 	 Future	 research	 should	 seek	 to	 investigate	 whether	 sector-specific	
features	and/or	regulatory	frameworks	of	the	markets	under	examination	influence	currency	exposure	relationships.		
Appropriate	 modeling/methodologies	 attenuating	 the	 nature	 of	 market	 data	 could	 be	 of	 vital	 importance.	 	 One	
should	 be	 very	 broad	minded,	 however,	when	 analyzing	 both	 risk	 factors	 and	 regulatory/economic	 environments	
where	financial	institutions	operate.		Any	framework	developed	should	bear	in	mind	the	dynamic	market	condition	
embracing	financial	intermediaries’	diverse	activities	and	risk	taking	nature.	
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Figure	1.	 Time	series	of	the	trade	weighted	currency	price	indices*	
	
	
	
*	The	trade	weighted	currency	price	index	is	the	relative	value	of	one	currency	against	a	basket	of	other	currencies	from	21	major	industrial	countries	–	source	
Bank	of	England.		The	level	of	the	currency	indices	has	been	rescaled	to	100	at	the	beginning	of	the	sample	period.	
	
	
Figure	2.	 Conditional	variances	of	the	trade	weighted	currency	price	indices	
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Table	1.	 Banking	and	Insurance	Portfolios	Information	
	
Panel	A.		 Sector	Portfolio	Size*	(Number	of	Institutions)	
		
Banking	Sector*	 Insurance	Sector	
Japan	 UK	 		 US	 		 Japan	 UK	 US	
Date	 All	 Small	 Large	 All	 All	 Small	 Large	 All	 All	 All	
2003	 79	 59	 20	 6	 86	 65	 21	 3	 19	 61	
2004	 80	 60	 20	 7	 98	 74	 24	 3	 22	 66	
2005	 81	 61	 20	 7	 101	 76	 25	 3	 26	 67	
2006	 83	 62	 21	 8	 105	 79	 26	 3	 27	 69	
2007	 84	 63	 21	 8	 111	 83	 28	 3	 33	 73	
2008	 84	 63	 21	 8	 111	 83	 28	 3	 34	 75	
2009	 86	 65	 21	 8	 112	 84	 28	 3	 34	 75	
2010	 87	 65	 22	 8	 113	 85	 28	 4	 34	 79	
2011	 87	 65	 22	 8	 114	 86	 28	 4	 34	 79	
*	 The	 large	 and	 small	 banking	 sector	 portfolios	 are	 rebalanced	 on	 an	 annual	
basis	 with	 large	 banks	 coming	 from	 the	 top	 25	 percentile	 while	 the	 rest	 are	
considered	small	banks.	
	
Panel	B.		 Sector	Portfolio	Statistics	
	
Daily	Return	(%)	
Banking	Sector	 Insurance	Sector	
Japan	 UK	 US	 Japan	 UK	 US	
All	 Small	 Large	 All	 All	 Small	 Large	 All	 All	 All	
	Mean	 -0.023	 -0.022	 -0.031	 -0.051	 -0.035	 -0.027	 -0.050	 -0.006	 0.004	 -0.015	
Mean-Pre	 0.000	 0.009	 -0.004	 -0.025	
	
-0.019	 -0.015	 -0.018	 0.064	 0.007	 0.013	
Mean-Post	 -0.077	 -0.123	 -0.066	 -0.105	 -0.073	 -0.130	 -0.049	 -0.162	 -0.002	 -0.083	
Mean-Pre*	 0.052	 0.064	 0.038	 0.001	 0.015	 0.025	 0.013	 0.098	 0.043	 0.042	
Mean-Post*	 -0.100	 -0.121	 -0.080	 -0.097	 -0.083	 -0.122	 -0.065	 -0.103	 -0.032	 -0.072	
	Maximum	 13.47	 13.21	 15.03	 15.17	 13.29	 13.06	 15.34	 12.328	 5.202	 10.386	
	Minimum	 -10.31	 -10.55	 -12.26	 -15.34	 -13.95	 -12.68	 -18.09	 -17.58	 -5.05	 -16.56	
	Std.	Dev.	 1.55	 1.49	 1.90	 1.85	 1.45	 1.27	 2.29	 2.44	 0.84	 1.76	
Distributional	Properties	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	Skewness	 -0.081	 -0.094	 0.006	 -0.207	 -0.529	 -0.821	 -1.031	 -0.223	 -0.134	 -1.019	
	Kurtosis	 10.019	 10.630	 9.089	 14.881	 27.178	 35.090	 16.976	 9.301	 7.097	 17.535	
Normality	Test	 3958	 4677	 2977	 11348	 47028	 82898	 16024	 3204	 1354	 17296	
ADF	Test	 -44.62	 -44.89	 -43.81	 -43.18	 -22.34	 -22.41	 -22.83	 -43.56	 -42.64	 -23.93	
The	Mean-Pre/Post	 represents	 the	average	daily	portfolio	 returns	before	and	after	September	15,	2008.	 	This	
date	 signifies	 the	 collapse	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers	 and	 is	 used	 as	 our	 cut-off	 point	 (structural	 break)	 for	 our	
estimations.	
The	Mean-Pre*/Post*	represents	the	average	daily	portfolio	returns	before	and	after	January	1,	2007.		This	date	
is	only	used	for	this	table	to	ascertain	that	the	daily	negative	performance	of	many	financial	institutions,	during	
the	whole	sample	period,	is	directly	related	to	their	poor	performance	during	the	crisis.	
The	normality	test	is	conducted	following	the	Jarque-Bera	test.			
The	ADF	Test	refers	to	the	Augmented	Dickey-Fuller	Unit	Root	Test.		
The	test	statistics	are	all	highly	significant	at	1%	level.	
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Table	2.								Joint-Hypotheses	Tests	
The	 following	 table	 summarizes	 the	 test	 statistics	 for	 the	 four	 joint-hypotheses	 tests	 designed	 to	
investigate	 the	 joint-significance	of	 the	estimated	parameters	 for	 the	FX	and	FXV	 risk	 factors.	 	 For	
each	hypothesis	test,	the	test	statistics	are	calculated	for	banking/insurance	portfolios	across	market	
and	sizes.	
		 All	Banks	 All	Insurers	 Large	Banks	 Small	Banks	
H1	 No	home	and/or	foreign	currency	variability	(FXV)	effect	
D.F.	 18	 18	 12	 12	
Test	Stat.	 0.00	 12.00	 0.00	 0.00	
p		values	 100.00%	 84.72%	 100.00%	 100.00%	
H2	 No	foreign	currency	changes	(FX)	and/or	variability	(FXV)	effects	
D.F.	 24	 24	 16	 16	
Test	Stat.	 64.00	 42.00	 36.00	 70.00	
p		values	 0.00%	 1.29%	 0.29%	 0.00%	
H3	 No	change	in	home	currency	(FX)	and/or	variability	(FXV)	effect	during	the	crisis	
D.F.	 6	 6	 4	 4	
Test	Stat.	 10.00	 2.00	 8.00	 6.00	
p		values	 12.47%	 91.97%	 9.16%	 19.91%	
H4	
No	change	in	home	and/or	foreign	currency	(FX)	and/or	variability	(FXV)	effects	
during	the	crisis	
D.F.	 18	 18	 12	 12	
Test	Stat.	 44.00	 38.00	 26.00	 52.00	
p		values	 0.06%	 0.39%	 1.07%	 0.00%	
	 	 	 	
D.F.	 represents	 degrees-of-freedom	 of	 the	 joint-hypothesis	 test,	 which	 is	 equal	 to	 the	 number	 of	
restricted	parameters	between	restricted	and	unrestricted	model.	
The	 Test	 Stat.	 represents	 the	 log-likelihood	 ratio	 test	 statistic	 which	 is	 the	 differences	 in	 log-
likelihood	function	value	between	the	restricted	and	unrestricted	model	multiplied	by	two.	
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Table	3.								VAR-BEKK	Models	for	Banking	Portfolios	
The	table	summarizes	the	estimated	parameters	 from	the	VAR-BEKK	model	 from	the	conditional	mean	
equation	 specified	 in	Equation	 (1a).	 	 Estimations	are	based	on	all	 size	banking	portfolios	 across	 Japan,	
U.K.	and	U.S.	markets.	
	
�!,! = �! +   !,!"#$%&��!,! +  !,!"��!,! + �!,!��!,! + �!,!���!,! +  !,!, � ��!,! +  !,! � ���!,! + �!,!	
		 Japanese	Banks	 UK	Banks	 US	Banks	
	 Coeff.	 Z-stat.	 		 Coeff.	 Z-Stat.	 		 Coeff.	 Z-stat.	 		
Mean	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Constant	 0.000	 -0.733	 		 0.000	 -0.430	 		 0.000	 -2.113	 **	
Market	(βi,Market)	 0.780	 38.671	 ***	 0.931	 19.733	 ***	 0.480	 36.94
1	
***	
IR	(βi,IR)	 0.014	 1.548	 		 -0.026	 -0.610	 		 0.035	 4.412	 ***	
FX	(gi,Japan)	 -0.013	 -0.283	 		 0.031	 0.712	 		 -0.021	 -0.914	 		
FX	(gi,UK)	 -0.009	 -0.139	 		 0.047	 0.683	 		 -0.005	 -0.182	 		
FX	(gi,US)	 -0.097	 -1.782	 *	 0.111	 1.688	 *	 -0.041	 -1.853	 *	
FXV	(zi,Japan)	 0.002	 0.038	 		 -0.008	 -0.020	 		 0.001	 0.031	 		
FXV	(zi,UK)	 -0.002	 -0.055	 		 0.001	 0.028	 		 0.001	 0.023	 		
FXV	(zi,US)	 0.001	 0.025	 		 0.001	 0.005	 		 0.003	 0.045	 		
D·FX	(γi,Japan)	 0.130	 1.643	 	 -0.172	 -0.766	 		 -0.200	 -4.055	 ***	
D·FX	(γi,UK)	 0.044	 0.466	 		 -0.002	 -0.007	 		 -0.044	 -0.808	 		
D·FX	(γi,US)	 0.025	 0.256	 		 -0.221	 -0.786	 		 -0.029	 -0.470	 		
D·FXV	(θi,Japan)	 -0.002	 -0.015	 		 -0.007	 -0.023	 		 0.003	 0.038	 		
D·FXV	(θi,UK)	 -0.003	 -0.006	 		 -0.001	 -0.022	 		 0.001	 0.031	 		
D·FXV	(θi,US)	 -0.003	 -0.014	 		 -0.001	 -0.034	 		 0.001	 0.017	 		
Variance	Equation	 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 0.000	 0.190	 		 0.315	 5.402	 ***	 0.004	 0.855	 		
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 1.000	 429.91
0	
***	 0.747	 20.432	 ***	 0.994	 197.6
80	
***	
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.046	 4.193	 ***	 0.040	 2.702	 ***	 0.146	 8.396	 ***	
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.958	 105.61
0	
***	 0.969	 92.074	 ***	 0.874	 72.99
8	
***	
Persistence	(Pre-Crisis)	 1.000	 		 		 1.063	 		 		 0.998	 		 		
Persistence	(Post-Crisis)	 1.004	 		 		 1.009	 		 		 1.020	 		 		
Log-Likelihood	 20264	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level,	respectively.	
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Table	4.								VAR-BEKK	Models	for	Insurance	Portfolios	
The	 table	 summarizes	 the	estimated	parameters	 from	 the	VAR-BEKK	model	with	 conditional	mean	
equation	specified	in	Equation	(1a).		Estimations	are	based	on	all	size	insurance	portfolios	across	the	
Japanese,	U.K.	and	U.S.	markets.	
	
�!,! = �! +   !,!"#$%&��!,! +  !,!"��!,! + �!,!��!,! + �!,!���!,! +  !,!, � ��!,! +  !,! � ���!,! + �!,!	
	 Japanese	Insurers	 UK	Insurers	 US	Insurers	
	 Coeff.	 Z-stat.	 		 Coeff.	 Z-Stat.	 		 Coeff.	 Z-stat.	 		
Mean	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Constant	 0.000	 0.318	 		 0.000	 0.550	 		 0.000	 -0.444	 		
Market	(βi,Market)	 0.982	 19.93
9	
***	 0.535	 32.37
6	
***	 0.903	 45.106	 ***	
IR	(βi,IR)	 -0.019	 -0.951	 		 -0.004	 -0.334	 		 -0.013	 -1.365	 		
FX	(gi,Japan)	 0.004	 0.041	 		 -0.070	 -2.486	 ***	 0.009	 0.315	 		
FX	(gi,UK)	 -0.048	 -0.342	 		 0.078	 1.892	 *	 0.081	 2.088	 **	
FX	(gi,US)	 -0.232	 -1.981	 **	 0.020	 0.609	 		 0.014	 0.414	 		
FXV	(zi,Japan)	 -0.003	 -0.017	 		 -0.004	 -0.007	 		 0.002	 0.017	 		
FXV	(zi,UK)	 -0.001	 -0.004	 		 -0.001	 -0.008	 		 -0.002	 -0.003	 		
FXV	(zi,US)	 0.000	 -0.023	 		 0.002	 0.006	 		 0.000	 0.005	 		
D·FX	(γi,Japan)	 0.087	 0.600	 		 0.099	 2.303	 ***	 -0.177	 -3.511	 ***	
D·FX	(γi,UK)	 0.063	 0.325	 		 0.073	 1.312	 		 -0.129	 -2.062	 **	
D·FX	(γi,US)	 -0.083	 -0.427	 		 -0.013	 -0.252	 		 -0.019	 -0.304	 		
D·FXV	(θi,Japan)	 -0.006	 -0.009	 		 0.008	 0.004	 		 0.001	 0.003	 		
D·FXV	(θi,UK)	 -0.002	 -0.011	 		 0.001	 0.008	 		 -0.002	 -0.004	 		
D·FXV	(θi,US)	 -0.002	 -0.014	 		 0.002	 0.084	 		 0.000	 -0.013	 		
Variance	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 0.000	 0.053	 		 0.000	 0.159	 		 0.002	 0.084	 		
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 0.998	 122.5
24	
***	 0.999	 397.3
46	
***	 0.997	 42.043	 ***	
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.042	 3.125	 ***	 0.014	 5.064	 ***	 0.091	 6.942	 ***	
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.963	 85.20
9	
***	 0.984	 404.1
04	
***	 0.919	 84.288	 ***	
Persistence	(Pre-Crisis)	 0.998	 		 		 0.999	 		 		 0.999	 		 		
Persistence	(Post-Crisis)	 1.005	 		 		 0.998	 		 		 1.009	 		 		
Log-Likelihood	 19978	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level,	respectively.	
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Table	5.								VAR-BEKK	Models	for	Large	Banking	Portfolios	
The	table	summarizes	the	estimated	parameters	from	the	VAR-BEKK	model	with	conditional	mean	
equation	 specified	 in	 Equation	 (1a).	 	 Estimations	 are	 based	 on	 large	 banking	 portfolios	 from	 the	
Japanese	and	the	U.S.	market.	
	
�!,! = �! +   !,!"#$%&��!,! +  !,!"��!,! + �!,!��!,! + �!,!���!,! +  !,!, � ��!,! +  !,! � ���!,! + �!,!	
	
	 Large	Japanese	Banks	 Large	US	Banks	
	 Coeff.	 Z-Stat.	 		 Coeff.	 Z-stat.	 		
Mean	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Constant	 0.000	 -0.860	 		 0.000	 -2.582	 ***	
Market	(β,Market)	 0.944	 46.104	 ***	 0.980	 47.184	 ***	
IR	(βi,IR)	 0.004	 0.311	 		 0.035	 2.731	 ***	
FX	(gi,Japan)	 0.012	 0.218	 		 -0.035	 -0.930	 		
FX	(gi,UK)	 0.033	 0.393	 		 0.013	 0.317	 		
FX	(gi,US)	 -0.159	 -2.413	 ***	 -0.054	 -1.367	 		
FXV	(zi,Japan)	 -0.003	 -0.012	 		 -0.005	 -0.032	 		
FXV	(zi,UK)	 -0.003	 -0.029	 		 -0.001	 -0.030	 		
FXV	(zi,US)	 0.000	 -0.032	 		 0.000	 0.060	 		
D·FX	(γi,Japan)	 0.130	 1.640	 	 -0.270	 -3.686	 ***	
D·FX	(γi,UK)	 0.009	 0.075	 		 -0.171	 -1.775	 *	
D·FX	(γi,US)	 0.045	 0.431	 		 0.066	 0.600	 		
D·FXV	(θi,Japan)	 -0.009	 -0.015	 		 -0.003	 -0.031	 		
D·FXV	(θi,UK)	 -0.004	 -0.009	 		 -0.001	 -0.020	 		
D·FXV	(θi,US)	 -0.004	 -0.016	 		 0.000	 -0.022	 		
Variance	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 0.000	 0.068	 		 0.099	 0.689	 		
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 1.004	 234.180	 ***	 0.912	 7.121	 ***	
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.069	 6.792	 ***	 0.065	 6.720	 ***	
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.936	 114.730	 ***	 0.937	 114.970	 ***	
Persistence	(Pre-Crisis)	 1.004	 		 		 1.011	 		 		
Persistence	(Post-Crisis)	 1.005	 		 		 1.002	 		 		
Log-Likelihood	 12791	 		 		 		 		 		
*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level,	respectively.	
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Table	6.								VAR-BEKK	Models	for	Small	Banking	Portfolios	
The	table	summarizes	the	estimated	parameters	from	the	VAR-BEKK	model	with	conditional	mean	
equation	 specified	 in	Equation	 (1a).	 	 Estimations	are	based	on	 small	banking	portfolios	 from	 the	
Japanese	and	the	U.S.	market.	
	
�!,! = �! +   !,!"#$%&��!,! +  !,!"��!,! + �!,!��!,! + �!,!���!,! +  !,!, � ��!,! +  !,! � ���!,! + �!,!	
	
	 Small	Japanese	Banks	 Small	US	Banks	
	 Coeff.	 Z-Stat.	 		 Coeff.	 Z-stat.	 		
Mean	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Constant	 0.000	 -0.862	 		 0.000	 -1.235	 		
Market	(βi,Market)	 0.732	 35.366	 ***	 0.309	 31.239	 ***	
IR	(βi,IR)	 0.019	 1.859	 *	 0.031	 5.172	 ***	
FX	(gi,Japan)	 -0.018	 -0.383	 		 -0.018	 -1.061	 		
FX	(gi,UK)	 -0.028	 -0.417	 		 0.004	 0.211	 		
FX	(gi,US)	 -0.072	 -1.104	 		 -0.044	 -2.333	 ***	
FXV	(zi,Japan)	 0.003	 0.026	 		 0.005	 0.029	 		
FXV	(zi,UK)	 -0.002	 -0.062	 		 0.004	 0.042	 		
FXV	(zi,US)	 0.001	 0.032	 		 0.007	 0.027	 		
D·FX	(γi,Japan)	 0.119	 1.455	 		 -0.195	 -3.973	 ***	
D·FX	(γi,UK)	 0.047	 0.497	 		 -0.026	 -0.469	 		
D·FX	(γi,US)	 -0.017	 -0.167	 		 -0.057	 -0.931	 		
D·FXV	(θi,Japan)	 0.001	 0.044	 		 0.004	 0.067	 		
D·FXV	(θi,UK)	 -0.002	 -0.040	 		 0.001	 0.050	 		
D·FXV	(θi,US)	 -0.002	 -0.038	 		 0.000	 0.028	 		
Variance	Equation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 0.004	 -0.803	 		 0.089	 1.249	 		
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Pre-Crisis)	 0.999	 211.970	 ***	 0.950	 16.609	 ***	
ARCH	(aii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.053	 4.873	 ***	 0.194	 8.736	 ***	
GARCH	(bii
2
,	Post-Crisis)	 0.952	 110.880	 ***	 0.831	 58.155	 ***	
Persistence	(Pre-Crisis)	 1.003	 		 		 1.040	 		 		
Persistence	(Post-Crisis)	 1.005	 		 		 1.025	 		 		
Log-Likelihood	 14394	 		 		 		 		 		
*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level,	respectively.	
	
	
